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A. Introduction
Without much doubt, the two great pillars of American scholarship on the German
Basic Law and the jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court are (in the
order of first appearance) Donald Kommers’s monumental casebook, The
Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany 1 and David Currie’s
magisterial treatise, The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany. 2 Professor
Kommers’s comprehensive work was a milestone in a long career that has been
very substantially devoted to the study of German constitutional law. In the late
1960s, Kommers spent a research year at the German Constitutional Court and,
drawing in part on personal interviews with the justices, he published the first
major work in English on that court. 3 Since then, Kommers has produced a steady
stream of significant works on German constitutional law.
David Currie’s treatise, on the other hand, came as more of a surprise. For several
decades Professor Currie, who died in late 2007 at the age of 71, was an eminent
figure in American public law. He was the author of an extraordinary number of
notable works on American federal courts, conflict of laws, environmental law, and
American constitutional law and history.
These works included eminent
casebooks, dozens of scholarly articles, and several important volumes on the
history of constitutional interpretation by the Supreme Court and the history of
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COURT (1976).
3

2082

GERMAN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 09 No. 12

debates on the Constitution in Congress. 4 Although Currie had also published
articles discussing topics in German constitutional law, 5 these articles had not
really presaged a treatise of this extraordinary scope and depth. Indeed, it is
nothing short of remarkable that, in the midst of his very full career concentrating
on some of the most complex and difficult aspects of American public law, David
Currie was able to produce this extensive and mature work on German
constitutional law, which required mastery not only of a foreign constitutional
system, but mastery of a foreign language as well. 6
As pillars of the American study of German constitutional law, these works of
Kommers and Currie focus on the German Basic Law and the German
Constitutional Court. In many important respects, however, they are both very
American products. Of course, the Kommers work is a casebook, and therefore it is
an example of a genre which, since its “invention” at Harvard in 1871 by
Christopher Columbus Langdell, 7 has been thoroughly American in its style and
development. Currie’s treatise does not represent a distinctively American genre,
but on the other hand, it does share many American traits.
To say this is by no means a criticism of Currie. It would be highly unreasonable to
expect an American scholar, trained in the methods of the common law, to be able
to “jump over his shadow” (to use a German expression) and fully internalize the
methods of analysis and processes of thought of a different legal system. (Indeed
Currie himself acknowledges as much when he disarmingly notes that American
observers are “separated [from the German system] by a cultural gap as well as an
ocean...”). 8 Moreover -- and this is the important point -- we would not necessarily
want a comparativist to become completely assimilated in a foreign system, even if
he or she were actually able to accomplish this improbable feat. Rather, one of the
4 See infra note 27. In addition to traditional legal articles, Currie contributed numerous shorter articles
on constitutional history and other topics to the second series of the Green Bag, a journal of informal
commentaries on the law.
5 David P. Currie, Lochner Abroad: Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection in the Federal Republic of
Germany, 1989 SUP. CT. REV. 333; David P. Currie, Separation of Powers in the Federal Republic of Germany,
41 AM. J. COMP. L. 201 (1993). These two articles are reprinted in this issue of the German Law Journal. See
also David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 864 (1986).
6 In addition to his attainments as a scholar, Professor Currie was, by all accounts, a great teacher in his
decades at the University of Chicago Law School. According to friends and colleagues, he was also a
notable performer in the operas of Gilbert & Sullivan. See generally, In Memoriam: David P. Currie (19362007), 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2008).
7

See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 125 n. 3 (1977).
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CURRIE, supra note 2, at 289.
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most valuable aspects of comparative law -- and in this instance, comparative
constitutional law -- is to subject the reasoning and decisions of one legal system to
analysis and criticism animated, at least in part, by thought processes of another
legal system. In this way, the material may yield unexpected insights -- both for the
comparativist viewing another legal system, and also for the scholars of that system
reading what “outsiders” have to say about their structures and doctrines. This is
presumably at least part of what Currie himself meant by including, as the
epigraph at the outset of his treatise, a thought-provoking remark of Thomas Mann
from Joseph and His Brothers: “For only by making comparisons can we distinguish
ourselves from others and discover who we are, in order to become all that we are
meant to be.”
B. Forms of Commentary
From this perspective, it may be useful to point up the significant ways in which
Currie’s work differs from standard German treatises on the same subject, and to
try to suggest some insights that American techniques might yield in the study of
German constitutional law.
First, it should be noted that Currie’s treatise is a relatively compact work by a
single author, and it divides the subject of German constitutional law into
conceptual chapters, such as the Federal System, Separation of Powers, and
Freedom of Expression. As might be expected, each of these chapters typically
covers cases and ideas that arise from more than one constitutional provision.
In contrast, the major German treatises on constitutional law differ significantly in
each of these respects. Instead of separating the material by conceptual chapters -as does Currie -- the major German treatises begin at the Preamble and Article 1 of
the Basic Law and then proceed systematically step by step through each
succeeding Article, analyzing the provision in general, and then typically analyzing
each sub-Article in a separate section or set of sections. 9 (Indeed, at least one major
9 Currie cites particularly the vast Maunz-Dürig commentary, which is probably the most
comprehensive, highly respected and frequently cited of all commentaries on the German Basic Law.
GRUNDGESETZ KOMMENTAR (Theodor Maunz, Günter Dürig, Roman Herzog et al. eds., edition with
looseleaf supplements 2008). Interestingly, Currie also frequently cites the “Alternative Commentary”
(AK), a more left-wing work that is generally intended to counter the conservative centrism of
commentaries such as Maunz-Dürig. See KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ FÜR DIE BUNDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND (REIHE ALTERNATIVKOMMENTARE) (Richard Baümlin et al., 1984). Even today, the AK is
ignored in much German constitutional writing and frequent citation of the AK, in the German
literature, generally counts as a statement of dissent from the “prevailing view” (herrschende Meinung) of
the traditional German constitutionalists. Currie notes that his “secondary sources” have been “selected
in order to afford a variety of views.” CURRIE, supra note 2, at xii. Other important commentaries on the
Basic Law -- also proceeding systemically through the constitutional text -- include, for example,
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commentary goes even further in this systematic method of analysis and sometimes
analyzes important phrases or even words, in separate subsections). 10 Typically, as
discussed further below, commentaries of this sort employ lapidary general
statements of doctrine, avoiding extended discussion of individual cases.
Originally, this form of commentary was employed for the explication of legal
codes, such as the civil, criminal, and procedural codes of German law. Whether
this traditional form is as well suited for the study of constitutional law is a
separate question that will be noted below.
Because of their scope and impressive level of detail, each of these standard
German constitutional treatises is a major undertaking of several volumes, and the
work is allocated among a number of different authors. Thus, while the authors
may (or may not) share the same general point of view, the chapters contributed by
one author may have their own distinctive qualities, differing from other chapters
in the work. 11
Another typical product of German constitutional scholarship is the “Handbook”
on constitutional law or on the law of the state. In these frequently-consulted
works, which also may run to several volumes, the material is divided up into
conceptual chapters, but -- here again -- separate chapters are typically contributed
by different eminent specialists. 12 In the various chapters of a “Handbook,” the
distinct points of view of the respective authors are likely to vary even more widely
than in the constitutional commentaries.

KOMMENTAR ZUM GRUNDGESETZ (Hermann v. Mangoldt, Friedrich Klein, Christian Starck eds., 5th ed.
2005); GRUNDGESETZ-KOMMENTAR (Ingo von Münch & Philip Kunig eds., 5th ed. 2000). In the American
constitutional literature, a similar technique was employed, for example, in the classic constitutional
commentary of Justice Story. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES (3d ed. 1858).
10

See von Münch & Kunig, supra note 9.

To take one example, the contributions of Günter Dürig to the Maunz-Dürig treatise are frequently
viewed as particularly distinctive and influential. See, e.g., KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZÜGE DES
VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND 137 (20th ed. 1995). In fact, the recent
replacement of one of Dürig’s original chapters with a new version by another scholar -- putting forth a
considerably different view of human dignity -- drew an emotional public rebuke from a former Justice
of the Constitutional Court. See Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, Die Würde des Menschen war unantastbar,
FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, Sept. 3, 2003.
11

12 Currie cites particularly HANDBUCH DES STAATSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (Josef
Isensee & Paul Kirchhof eds., 1st ed. 1987; 2nd ed. 2003). For another such “Handbook,” see HANDBUCH
DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND (Ernst Benda, Werner Maihofer, HansJochen Vogel eds., 2nd ed. 1994). This type of work was also produced under the Weimar Constitution of
1919. See HANDBUCH DES DEUTSCHEN STAATSRECHTS (Gerhard Anschütz & Richard Thoma eds., 1930).
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There are, however, several books in the German literature that are more like
Professor Currie’s treatise. One of the most eminent of these is Fundamental
Principles of the Constitutional Law of the Federal Republic of Germany by Konrad
Hesse, a noted teacher of constitutional law and a former member of the
Constitutional Court. 13 This is a book that covers, in general, the same material that
is discussed by Professor Currie and it is a volume by a single author that is
approximately the same length as Professor Currie’s treatise. Although it is
intended principally as an introduction to constitutional law for students -- and
therefore technically falls within the genre of Lehrbuch or textbook 14 -- Hesse’s
volume is actually a work of considerable subtlety and complexity, and it is
regularly cited in the German scholarly literature.
From our perspective, however, what is most interesting is the quite dramatic
distinction between the method of analysis employed by Currie, and that which is
more common in Hesse’s Fundamental Principles -- and, indeed, in almost all of the
longer German treatises as well. 15 This is a difference that should come as no
surprise, given the differing characteristics of the respective legal systems. The
discussion in the German treatises tends to contain general statements of principle,
of greater or lesser complexity. Although cases are regularly cited, they tend to be
collected in non-textual footnotes and clearly occupy a subordinate role. The cases
themselves, and the facts behind the cases, are not commonly discussed.
In contrast it is clear that, as a scholar educated in the Anglo-American case law
system, Currie is primarily interested in cases -- and particularly, of course, the
cases of the German Constitutional Court. Accordingly, these cases are frequently
the primary focus of Currie’s attention, and the language and context of the
opinions are often very closely analyzed. There are many notable examples. This
case-centered approach is clearly evident, for example, in Currie’s long discussion
of the famous Parliamentary Dissolution Case, which allowed the Bundestag to be
dissolved, and a new election to be held, after Chancellor Kohl’s bogus “loss” of a
vote of no confidence in 1982. 16 Currie discusses the case in the American style as a
sort of story with accompanying analysis throughout. Currie presents the dramatic
HESSE, supra note 11. For another one-volume treatment by an eminent German law teacher, see, e.g.,
PETER BADURA, STAATSRECHT (3d ed. 2003).

13

14 Traditionally, the Lehrbuch or textbook has played a central role in legal education in Germany. Much
more important than the American “hornbook,” which it resembles in some respects, the Lehrbuch tends
to be the form of source material that is most widely read by students in the course of their studies.

On this point, see also Markus Dirk Dubber, Book Review, 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 107, 108 (1996). This
review is reprinted in this issue of the German Law Journal.

15

16

BVerfGE 62, 1 (1983).
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facts behind the decision, follows the twists and turns of the relevant arguments,
finds some similarities between the Court’s opinion and the American political
question doctrine, and ultimately suggests that, in upholding the questionable
dissolution, the Court was engaging in “strategic behavior.” 17 In the treatment of
the same general topic by Konrad Hesse, in contrast, the results of this case are
transmuted into general statements and the drama, and the nuances, of the specific
decision disappear. 18 Similarly, in a series of extended case analyses, Professor
Currie examines the facts and argumentation of the major free expression cases in
the German Constitutional Court, proceeding case by case and interlacing the
analysis with illuminating American comparisons. 19 As Currie remarks, “only an
examination of actual decisions can give us an insight into the degree of freedom
that prevails in Germany.” 20 Later in the same chapter, Professor Currie presents
three of the crucial Cold War cases in the Constitutional Court, analyzing them in a
trenchant manner and including American comparisons throughout. 21 Currie
notes that, even though the United States has no constitutional provision
authorizing the banning of political parties (such as that contained in Article 21 (2)
of the German Basic Law), formulations employed by the Constitutional Court do
not differ greatly from the doctrinal results reached in Dennis v. United States, 22 a
contemporaneous Cold War case in the United States Supreme Court. A close
examination of the relevant cases makes this point considerably more vividly than
would a general statement of principles or comparison of textual provisions.
Similarly, Currie’s extremely sophisticated discussion of the problem of
nondelegation (with numerous apt American comparisons) is basically an
American-style discussion of cases which sets forth the underlying facts in each
case -- including, particularly, the details of the statutory delegation -- and
discovers and analyzes the relevant trends in the German decisions and the
surprisingly diverse constitutional provisions on which the decisions are based. 23
In this discussion we see Currie, the American administrative lawyer, impressively
transferred to the German realm.
17

CURRIE, supra note 2, at 113-16.

18

HESSE, supra note 11, at 268.

19 CURRIE, supra note 2, at 178-207. In particular, Currie discusses a number of important cases at some
length: BVerfGE 7, 198 (1958) (Lüth); BVerfGE 25, 256 (1969) (Blinkfüer); BVerfGE 12, 113 (1961) (SchmidSpiegel); BVerfGE 30, 173 (1971) (Mephisto); BVerfGE 34, 269 (1973) (Soraya).
20

CURRIE, supra note 2, at 181.

21

Id. at 213-27.

22

341 U.S. 494 (1951).

23

CURRIE, supra note 2, at 125-34.
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In this context, Currie’s work may be enlightening for American and other nonGerman readers as an excellent introduction to the actual work of the
Constitutional Court. But beyond that, Currie’s work may also be enlightening for
German readers as an indication of the flexibility and subtlety that can be achieved
by the analysis of cases, in what has become in reality -- under the influence of the
German Constitutional Court -- very much a case law system. Indeed, Currie’s
subtle and trenchant analysis of the cases might also raise a question about whether
traditional techniques of German commentary -- which have arisen in the context of
private law codification, where cases generally play a minor role -- can ultimately
do justice to the complexity and often creative unruliness of a constitutional case
law system. 24
C. Cases and Constitutional History
Currie’s treatise has many additional virtues. As suggested above, one of the most
notable is Professor Currie’s apparently comprehensive mastery of hundreds of
German decisions -- not only the famous cases that set the general outlines of
German constitutional law, but also the subsequent cases which fill in the details
and are frequently as important as the major cases themselves for the purpose of
truly understanding the realities of the German system. In the preface, Professor
Currie remarks that he has limited his reading of commentaries to a few of the most
famous treatises “in the interest of finishing this book within the present
[twentieth] century...” 25 But, significantly, there is no comparable indication of any
limitation of Professor Currie’s extraordinarily deep reading in the German
decisions. 26 Currie regards the cases as primary, and the treatises and similar
material as secondary. Certainly, any American observer would accept this view as
self-evident; but it is an approach that may still be somewhat controversial in
continental legal cultures.
Particularly in his later work, Professor Currie became an important legal historian,
tracing the history of the American Supreme Court and the history of constitutional
24 See Dubber, supra note 15, at 108: “It would have been unusual for a German book on the constitution
to rely as heavily on opinions of the German constitutional court as does Professor Currie’s. The
German commentators are still having a hard time acknowledging that the deference to written law
texts, characteristic of a formalistic civil law system that has developed marvelously complex
interpretive techniques to subsume particular fact scenarios under statutory principles, goes out the
window as soon as these techniques are applied to such texts as the guarantee of human dignity in
Article 1(1) of the Basic Law.”
25

CURRIE, supra note 2, at xii.

26

See id. at xi.
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debates in Congress, in six comprehensive volumes. 27 His interest in constitutional
history -- and his evident conviction that this history has strong illuminating power
for the present -- also comes through very clearly in his work on the German
Constitution. Thus, in order to provide background for the German cases,
Professor Currie frequently introduces enlightening historical material from earlier
German constitutions, such as the abortive Paul’s Church Constitution of 1849, the
Prussian Constitution of 1850, and Bismarck’s Imperial Constitution of 1871, as well
as early versions of the post-war German state constitutions. The Weimar
Constitution of 1919 was clearly the most important predecessor of the German
Basic Law, frequently providing useful examples to be followed but sometimes also
containing cautionary mistakes to be avoided. Currie clearly immersed himself in
the provisions of the Weimar Constitution as well as contemporaneous
commentary on that constitution, and the treatise provides a particular depth of
reference to this important historical material.
There are also numerous
illuminating references to the discussions at the Herrenchiemsee meeting and in the
Parliamentary Council, where the Basic Law was drafted and then ultimately
adopted.
In a trait that is particularly valuable for American readers, Currie’s discussion of
the German doctrine constantly refers back to comparable American problems. As
one might expect, Professor Currie’s knowledge of the German cases is certainly
matched by his deep knowledge of the jurisprudence of the American Supreme
Court -- again, not only the famous cases but many relatively obscure cases that
nonetheless illustrate important points. The author of a two-volume constitutional
history of the Supreme Court is certainly evident in these passages.
D. Comprehensive Treatment
Although Professor Currie does not cover all the topics of German constitutional
law, the major areas are comprehensively treated. After an introductory chapter
which outlines relevant aspects of German constitutional history and usefully
surveys general traits of the Basic Law (Chapter 1), Currie turns to federalism and
the separation of powers, structural issues that occupied much of his attention in
American constitutional law as well. In two subtle and realistic chapters (Chapters
2 & 3), Currie notes the complementary effect of these and other doctrines in
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888
(1985); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 1888-1986
(1990); DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801 (1997);
DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE JEFFERSONIANS, 1801-1829 (2001); DAVID P.
CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DEMOCRATS AND WHIGS, 1829-1861 (2005); DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, 1829-1861 (2005).
27
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checking excessive power in the German system. For example, Currie finds that
aspects of German federalism, as well as the independence of the civil service,
substantially compensate for the merging of the legislative and executive powers in
a parliamentary system. 28 Moreover, the ability of a strong minority party to
commence and to guide a parliamentary investigation provides another “important
means of control of the executive.” 29 Currie also teases out certain “less obvious”
aspects of the separation of powers -- such as the doctrine that, in many areas
particularly relating to basic rights, the executive may not act in the absence of
authorization by the legislature. 30
In the German system, the federal government has the authority to enact most
legislation, but the strong legislative role of the Bundesrat (made up of
representatives of the states), as well as the states’ major role in the execution of
federal law, tends to redress what might otherwise be overwhelming federal
power. The intertwining nature of the institutions of separation of powers and
federalism in Germany -- both intended to work against undue concentration of
power -- is strikingly encapsulated by Currie in the following passage:
State administration of federal law in Germany is
motivated in part by the same considerations that
underlie our separation of legislative and executive
powers. The dangers of an all-powerful federal
executive were all too vividly illustrated during the
Nazi period; the risk of inadequate enforcement is
the price of protection against prosecutorial abuse.
The Basic Law goes beyond our Constitution by
taking enforcement not only out of legislative hands
but largely out of federal hands as well; in a
parliamentary system this may be necessary to
assure effective freedom from legislative control. 31
Overall, Currie’s flexible discussion of separation of powers in the German system
contrasts somewhat, in tone at least, with the more hard line conceptual position

28

CURRIE, supra note 2, at 103.

29

Id. at 110.

30

Id. at 121-25.

31

Id. at 68.
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that he tended to adopt in commenting on the separation of powers in the United
States. 32
In a detailed chapter on German federalism, Currie perceptively expands the scope
of his examination by including “additional layers” 33 of federalism that have no
parallels in the constitutional law of the United States. On the one side, the Basic
Law contains express guarantees of independence for municipal governments 34
and, on the other side, Germany is a constituent state within the more
encompassing European Union, a relationship that is also expressly recognized and
authorized in the German Basic Law. 35 These additional “layers” create a further
network of constitutional rules that limit both the states and the federal
government.
In Germany, as in the United States, the freedom of expression is a subject of
absorbing interest, presenting no small measure of unresolved mysteries and
conundrums. In his long chapter on the freedom of expression (Chapter 4), Currie
examines the meaning and implications of the balancing test that the Constitutional
Court has primarily used in cases in that area. Because a “balancing test is no more
protective of expression than the judges who administer it,” 36 Currie’s examination
takes the form of a long series of case analyses, accompanied by frequent references
to the constitutional history of the Weimar Constitution and the drafting of the
Basic Law. Currie sees these cases as falling into an early period in which the
Constitutional Court “evinced a fierce attachment to the values of free expression,”
followed by a significant period of lesser protection, which was in turn followed by
a renewed period of greater protection. 37 Currie notes that the degree of protection
extended by the Court is often related to the justices’ willingness or unwillingness
to defer to the lower courts on the question of whether the balancing was properly
undertaken. Currie’s sustained analysis of the cases in this chapter well reveals the
often chaotic nature of a constitutional case law system, which cannot be wholly
domesticated by general formulas, no matter how capacious.

32

See David P. Currie, The Distribution of Powers after Bowsher, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 19.

33

CURRIE, supra note 2, at 35; 81-100.

34

GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 28(2) (F.R.G.).

35

Id. art. 23 (F.R.G.).

36

CURRIE, supra note 2, at 181.

Id. Currie’s analysis ends of course in 1993, shortly before his treatise was published, but it seems fair
to say in general that the period of greater protection has extended up to the present.

37
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In the chapter on Church and State which follows (Chapter 5), Professor Currie
assists American readers in making their way through the maze of relevant
constitutional provisions (a number of which are drawn directly from the Weimar
Constitution) by analyzing the cases under the familiar American rubrics of
“establishment of religion” and “religious freedoms.”
In a final tour de force in his last substantive chapter (Chapter 6), Professor Currie
surveys a broad range of other constitutional rights recognized in the jurisprudence
of the German Constitutional Court. Some of these, such as rights of property and
equality, are expressly mentioned in both the German and American constitutions;
others, like rights of marriage, family, private schools and rights of illegitimate
children, are expressly mentioned in the German Basic Law but not in the
American Constitution –- although they have received at least some degree of
protection from the American Supreme Court. Yet the Constitutional Court has
protected several other important rights (whether or not specifically mentioned in
the Basic Law) that go far beyond any rights now recognized by the Supreme
Court. Indeed, overall, this final chapter emphasizes the much broader extension of
rights under the Basic Law, as well as the degree of seriousness with which many
“substantive” rights –- such as the right to choose an occupation -- are enforced in
the German system.
E. Central Themes
Indeed, looking back over the work as a whole, the reader will note that a number
of important themes (or one may say leitmotivs) wind their way through the
volume. For example, the topic of “positive” rights of individuals (or constitutional
obligations of the state) runs through the entire treatise as an important theme. 38
This is a topic of particular fascination for American observers, because the absence
of social welfare rights and other affirmative governmental obligations is the trait
that most dramatically distinguishes the eighteenth century Constitution of the
United States from certain prominent twentieth century constitutions. In the late
1960s, at the end of the Warren Court period, there were notable (but unsuccessful)
attempts to try to locate such affirmative governmental obligations in the broad
language of the American fourteenth amendment. 39 Although the Basic Law
contains only a few indications of the existence of such rights, the Constitutional
Court has been rather receptive to the imposition of constitutional obligations on
the state in various ways. In some instances these constitutional obligations require
38

See also Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, supra note 5.

39 See, e.g., Frank L. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
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the government to impose burdens on individuals (as in the abortion cases 40 ), and in
some instances these obligations require the government to furnish benefits to
individuals or groups (as in an important case providing subsidies for some private
schools). 41 Currie discusses several variations on these themes throughout the
course of the treatise.
The legacy of the New Deal judicial crisis still haunts American constitutional law,
and it particularly haunts those who -- like Professor Currie (and the present
writer) -- were taught by those who had actually experienced that crisis. One of the
important results of the New Deal crisis was the Supreme Court’s withdrawal from
judicial review of economic regulation under the doctrine of “substantive due
process” as it was applied, for example, in the famous case of Lochner v. New York. 42
Many spectres haunt German constitutional law, but, interestingly, this is not one
of them. Accordingly, the German Constitutional Court has been much more
willing to pass upon the substantive “reasonableness” of legislation under openended doctrines that resemble the American doctrine of “substantive due process.”
The extent to which the German Constitutional Court has applied doctrines of this
kind, forms another of the major themes of Currie’s treatise. Currie finds that a
number of provisions of the Basic Law “have been employed to make the
Constitutional Court ultimate censor of the reasonableness of all governmental
action.” 43 Although it is clear that Currie deplores this sort of tendency in the
United States, he nonetheless seems to harbor some grudging admiration for this
development in Germany, noting that “[u]nlike their American counterparts during
the Lochner years, the German judges do not seem often to have blocked desirable
or even fairly debatable reforms; they do seem to have spared their compatriots a
flock of unjustified restrictions on liberty and property.” 44 Yet ultimately Currie
questions whether a power of this sort “is consistent with one’s conception of
democracy.” 45
In another interesting general theme, Currie looks back with a measure of nostalgia
on certain largely vanished or depreciated doctrines in American constitutional
law, which, however, remain current and alive in the jurisprudence of the German
40

BVerfGE 39, 1 (1975); BVerfGE 88, 203 (1993).

41

BVerfGE 75, 40 (1987).

42

198 U.S. 45 (1905).

43

CURRIE, supra note 2, at 337.

44

Id. at 338.

45

Id.
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Constitutional Court. These include, for example, what Currie sees as the
“inferior” status of property rights in American constitutional law -- rights that are
not so “relegated” in the German cases. 46 Currie also approves the Constitutional
Court’s active policing of the border-line between state and federal authority -which, as Currie notes, has largely fallen by the wayside in American constitutional
law. Interestingly, Currie’s treatise was published in 1994, the year before the
Supreme Court decided United States v. Lopez, 47 the case in which the Court began
to reimpose serious limits on congressional power under the Commerce Clause. It
would have been interesting to know the extent to which Currie believed that Lopez
and its progeny (for example, United States v. Morrison 48 ) brought the American
decisions into closer alignment with the German approach to this subject.
Certainly, in later writing, Currie welcomed the Lopez case and similar decisions,
like Printz and City of Boerne v. Flores. 49 Similarly, in another nostalgic backward
glance, Currie measures the rather vigorous enforcement of the nondelegation
doctrine by the German Constitutional Court, against its virtual abandonment by
the American Supreme Court, and comes to the conclusion “that we [in the United
States] have lost something significant that the Germans have worked hard to
maintain.” 50 Yet Currie’s own discussion of the nondelegation problem may
suggest an important historical difference between the role of that doctrine in the
two systems: In the United States the nondelegation doctrine has often been
asserted in an attempt to thwart progressive economic regulation; in Germany, in
contrast, unduly broad delegations may evoke unpleasant memories of the
“Ermächtigungsgesetz”, the statute through which the Weimar Parliament in 1933
relinquished its power to the Hitler regime. 51
F. Conclusion
As we move away in time from the publication of this extraordinary treatise -- and
as the German Constitutional Court accumulates new decisions that may confirm,
qualify, or alter the conclusions and analysis set forth by Professor Currie -- readers
who are interested in the study of German constitutional law will increasingly miss
46

Id. at 290.
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514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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529 U.S. 598 (2000).

David P. Currie, Subsidiarity, 1 GREEN BAG 2ND SERIES 359, 361 (1998); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
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See id. at 125-26.
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Professor Currie’s commentary on these new developments. No similar work
seems to be in the wings, and certainly it is unlikely that anyone else will achieve
the depth of understanding of both the German and the American constitutional
cases that was so uniquely possessed by David Currie. But this volume,
approaching German constitutional law from a basically American perspective, will
stand as a monument to the illumination that can be provided by the deep,
comprehensive and perceptive comparison of constitutional systems.

